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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RAINER F. HUCK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19180

PATRICIA ANN HUCK,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action between Plaintiff and Defendant
in which the parties originally asked for a judicial determination regarding property rights, alimony, child support,
and child custody.

The sole issues on appeal, however, concern

the property distribution, award of temporary alimony, and
attorneys'

fees.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The original Complaint was filed by Plaintiff against
Defendant in April of 1979.

The court file will reflect

numerous events which occurred from that time until the filing
of this appeal.

These events included a dispute as to which

party should live in the residence, an effort by Defendant to
disqualify Plaintiff's attorney, several hearings concerning

child support and custody, two pre-trial efforts to sesregate
property before trial, and finally, a two-day trial before

th~

Honorable James S. Sawaya involving some ten witnesses and
numerous exhibits.
The lower court rendered a Memorandum Decision in April of
1981.

(R.

397-398).

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law in accordance with the decision were entered in June of
1982.

In April of 1983 Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend

the Findings was denied.
Plaintiff now appeals from the judgment entered against
him and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support
thereof.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's
judgment in the following particulars:

vacation of any award

for temporary alimony, vacation of any award for temporary
attorneys' fees, and modification of the property distribution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The present appeal before this Court is truly unique.
After reviewing numerous divorce actions decided by this Court
it is not an exaggeration to say that the present case involves
elements, both factual and legal, which have never been previously litigated.

The attorneys for both parties,

together

with the lower court judges, all have acknowledged the difficulty in solving and dealing with the unique facts in this
case and the unusual legal issues involved.
-2-

For this reason, Appellant will attempt to eliminate those
facts which are not related to issues relevant to this appeal.
For example, while the question of child custody, visitation,
and child support were hotly contested in the lower court,
Appellant believes that the lower court did not abuse its
discretion in making these awards.

Therefore, even though

Appellant feels strongly about the child related issues, the
evidence relating to these issues will not be discussed herein.
The heart of this appeal concerns the validity of a prenuptial agreement, the circumstances surrounding the marriage
and the acquisition of certain real estate by Plaintiff, and the
ability of Defendant to support herself after the separation of
the parties and during the pendency of the divorce.

Thus, a

history of the marriage of the parties, their relationship
during the marriage, and the financial ability of each party
after separation are all relevant to this appeal.
Appellant recognizes that this Court has the power under
the Utah Constitution to completely review all of the evidence
de novo in spite of the lower court's findings.

However, Appellant

is also aware that this Court will defer to the lower court's
decision unless there is clear abuse or misapplication of the
law.

Stone v. Stone,

431 P. 2d 802

(Utah 1967).

For this reason,

and for the convenience of the court, Plaintiff shall state
these facts most favorably to the defendant-wife.

When there

is a factual dispute in which the court's decision is subject
to dispute, Appellant shall state such contrary evidence in
brackets.

It is hoped that by using this method this Court will
-3-

be able to quickly review all of the evidence that was availablE
to the lower court in making its decision and will be able to
determine quickly whether the lower court ignored substantial
evidence in support of the arguments raised by Plaintiff.
EVENTS PRIOR TO MARRIAGE RELATING TO PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff Rainer Huck (hereinafter Rainer) entered the
University of Utah in 1964 and obtained a B.S. degree in 1968.
(Tr. 441).
engineering.

In 1968 he entered a graduate program in electrical
By 1971 he had completed most of his classwork

and was working on a dissertation entitled "Critical Re-examination of the Special Theory of Relativity."

(Tr. 443).

This thesis was submitted by the engineering department to
the physics department for its corrunents.

The ohysics depart-

ment rejected the theory proffered by Mr. Huck and rejected
the paper.

(Tr. 445).

Nevertheless, Mr. Huck believed that the theory known as
the "Reciprocal System Theory" had great scientific promise
and felt that it was worthy of a lifetime career goal.

He

knew, however, based upon his experience with the physics
department that it would be very difficult for him to obtain
any funding to do this type of work through conventional sources
He therefore decided to endeavor to establish an independent
fund for himself so that he could continue his research independently.

(Tr. 445-446).

In 1974 Mr. Huck obtained his Ph.D. degree from the
University of Utah in electrical engineering by subm1ttino a
-4-

completely unrelated dissertation to the one previously rejected
by the physics department.
In 1971 he purchased his own home at 1195 South Windsor
Street.

He purchased the home with his own funds and from money

lent to him by his father.

(Tr. 443).

In 1972, as part of his plan to develop rental properties,
he purchased another property at Lindon Avenue.

This property

was jointly owned between Mr. Huck and his close personal
friend, Craig S. Cook, who was his trial counsel and is now
his appellate counsel.

(Tr. 448).

Prior to his marriage he

purchased the following additional houses for rental property:
923 South 4th East (jointly with Mr. Cook); 837 Menlow Avenue
(jointly with Mr. Cook); 1161 Bueno Avenue (jointly with Mr.
Cook); 227-229 Iowa Street (jointly with Mr. Cook); 334 Stanton
Avenue, 633 Grand Street; 1127 Milton Avenue.
During this period of time Mr. Huck was continually reading
and researching concerning the scientific theory he wished to
advance but was also putting in a great deal of time with the
rental properties.

He was instrumental in founding the

"New Science Advocates" which was an organization dedicated to
the study and evaluation of the Reciprocal System.
treasurer of that organization.

He became

(Tr. 473).

PRE-MARITAL RELATION OF THE PARTIES
In 1972 he met his future wife Patricia Huck (hereinafter
Pat) at a party given by Stan Secor.

Throughout 1973 and 1974

he began dating her more frequently perhaps two or three times
-5-

a week.

At that time Pat was working in the rh.n. EcHJ<!Lam

biology and had been there since 1970.

11"1

(Tr. 448-4-19).

As they continued to date there were substantial problems
and personality differences causing a lot of arguments.
450).

(Tr.

During the latter part of 1974 the parties had a discuss.

in which Pat said she was leaving Salt Lake when she completed
her Ph.D. degree which would be in about six months.

They

agreed that they would continue dating until that time.
453, 662).

(Tr.

For the two years they had been dating the parties

had had a sexual relationship and Pat had used contraception
to prevent pregnancy.

Shortly after the conversation in the

middle of December, however, she became pregnant.

(Tr. 663).

In 1975 Rainer was 28 and had never been married.
33 and was a widow from a prior marriage.

(Tr.

348).

Pat was
In

January of 1975 Pat informed Rainer that she was pregnant.
At that point in time marriage was discussed in great detail
but Rainer felt the problems were still inevitable and that a
marriage would not be advisable.
Rainer did not want to marry her.

(Tr. 454).

As stated by Pat,

(Tr. 663).

Pat went to Rainer's parents and told them about the situation.

She asked them to try to convince Rainer to marry her.

(Tr. 455).

She stated she thought that his mother would like t:

have grandchildren and would encourage the marriage.

!Tr.

66J

A great deal of discussion occurred during the early month.·
of 1975 as to the alternatives which were available.
suggested that Pat obtain an abortion since

h~

that a child should be brought into a situation
-6-

diJ not
~here

Fainer
bel1e~e
t~e

~art1e

were doomed to be unhappy.

(Tr. 454, 613).

an abortion and was happy to be pregnant.

Pat did not want
She told Rainer that

she wanted to have a child and intended on having a child.
(Tr. 613) .
[Rainer testified that Pat repeatedly told him that if he
did not marry her she was going to commit suicide.

She began

leaving her valuable possessions on his doorstep on a daily
basis saying that she would not need them any more.

(Tr. 455).

Pat denied ever threatening suicide or ever leaving possessions
on his doorstep.

(Tr. 663)].

THE SIGNING OF THE PRE-MARITAL AGREEMENT
Sometime in February or early March of 1975 Rainer agreed
to marry her.

He told her, however, that under these circum-

stances he thought they should have a prenuptial agreement.
(Tr. 457).

[Mr. Huck contended that he informed her of this

pre-nuptial agreement almost a month before the marriage.
457) .]

(Tr.

Mrs. Huck contended that she was not given the document

until three or four days prior to the marriage.

(Tr. 614)

The pre-nuptial agreement was prepared by Mr. Huck's
attorney, Craig Cook.

He asked her to take it to her attorney,

Wally Sandack, so that he could examine it, counsel her, and
execute his signature.

Mr. Sandack advised her not to sign

the document nor to marry Mr. Huck.
document himself.

He refused to sign the

(Tr. 458; 615).

She returned the document to Rainer at which time he had
it modified so as not to require any signature of either counsel.

(Tr. 459).
-7-

Each party listed the assets which they were bringing
into the marriage.

A list of all the properties previously

acquired by Rainer was attached to the prenuptial agreement
including an additional notation of "cash and personal
property" worth $15,000.

It is stated in paragraph 2 that Pat

brought into the marriage property worth approximately $1,000.
[Mr. Huck testified that Pat supplied this $1,000 figure.
461) . ]

(Tr.

Pat testified that this figure was inserted by her

husband and Mr. Cook and that since she believed she did not
have adequate counsel they could go ahead and put in anything
they wanted to.

(Tr. 665).

The prenuptial agreement was signed on April 9, 1975 before
a notary public.

This was one day prior to the marriage which

interestingly enough was performed by Judge Sawaya who also
presided over the divorce trial.
EVENTS DURING THE MARRIAGE
Sophie Huck was born on September 21, 1975.

(Tr. 467).

While this issue was contested below, for purposes of this
appeal it will be assumed that Pat Huck performed the necessary
duties as a housewife and mother.

It should also be noted that

from the time of the marriage up until July of 1978 Pat was
actively pursuing her attempt to obtain a Ph,D. degree.

As

part of this program she was appointed a teaching assistant
and taught every other quarter.

She received a tax-free stipend

of $375 a month during this period.

(Tr. 615-616).

Except for

an additional $40 a month she received from a California invest-8-

ment, her sole independent income was limited to the governmental stipend.

(Tr. 625; R. 113).

Rainer obtained the majority of his income from the rental
houses which he had purchased prior to the marriage.

(Tr. 475).

He spent substantial time fixing up and dealing with the rentals.
(Tr. 636).
Rainer testified that within the first week or two of the
marriage the two parties had a conversation regarding property
and finance.

Pat said she wanted to keep her money separate

and that he should likewise keep his separate.

She wanted to

divide the costs of living as equally as possible.

(Tr. 464).

He testified that he did not feel this was a good way to run a
marriage but that if she wanted to do it that way there was no
other alternative.

(Tr. 465).

Pat admitted that she felt hostile

during the early part of the marriage because of a number of things
including the prenuptial agreement.

(Tr. 666).

The evidence shows that Pat maintained her maiden name at
the University of Utah.

Under this unusual marriage arrangement

each party maintained their own separate checking and savings
accounts.
account.

All rental money he received went strictly into his
All money that she received from the University went

into her account.

(Tr. 471).

Under the agreement Rainer was to provide the house and
pay the taxes and utilities with the exception of the electric
bill which Pat agreed to pay.
of the food,

She agreed to pay the majority

to maintain medical insurance on the family, and

to provide the costs of her own automobile.
-9-

(Tr. 472, 619).

In addition, she paid for the hospital and doctor costs involveo
with the birth of her daughter and for any babysittu1q fees.
(Tr. 616-617).

[Rainer testified that it was Pat's position

that she did not want him to have anything to do with either
the child or the expenses with respect to the child as was
expressed in paragraph 4 of the prenuptial agreement.

(Tr. 544)

The question of Pat's involvement in the marriage with the
rental properties will be discussed in the legal argument concerning estoppel.

Appellant believes that there was oven.,,helmir.:

evidence that she expressed repeatedly her desire to have no
interest in any acquired properties and, in fact, refused to
assist him in any way in this venture.

More importantly, however

Appellant shall state facts which show that

he relied upon

her representations during the course of the marriage on the
mistaken belief that by assisting her and the child during her
education she would make no claim against any betterment he may
have made in the acquisition of new properties.
During the first year of the marriage, 1975, additional
properties were acquired by Rainer.

A property located at

629 Harmony Court was purchased on June 9, 1975.

$3,000 was

put down to acquire that house and the money was withdrawn
from Rainer's savings account of premarital funds.
Ex.

(Tr. 507;

5).

In August of 1975 a duplex was purchased at 942-46
Avenue.

The down payment for this

~roperty

Harvar~

also came from

Plaintiff's premarital funds which were withdrawn from a savincs
account.

(Ex.

5,

Ex .

6) .

-10-

In 1976 an additional house was jointly purchased with
Craig Cook utilizing premarital funds as Plaintiff's share of
the down payment.

This house was located at 860 Parkway Avenue.

(R. 94, Ex. 5, Ex. 6).

In addition, Plaintiff purchased two

other houses in 1976 with money obtained from the rental income
of the other properties.

These houses were located at 215 Iowa

Street and 848 Green Street (which was again purchased with
Mr. Cook).

(R. 93-94; Tr. 520).

In 1977 three additional properties were purchased.

In

September of 1977 a house at 653 Egli Court was purchased
jointly with Mr. Cook.

The money used by Rainer as his portion

of the down payment was also withdrawn from his savings account
which contained premarital funds.

(Ex. 5, Ex. 6, Ex. 32).

During that same month a property located at 224 Iowa
Street was purchased jointly with defendant Pat Huck.

His

share of the down payment was obtained on a loan from his father,
Herman Huck.

(Tr. 521; Ex. 5).

Her share was obtained from an

investment she sold in California.

(Tr. 672-673).

As will be

discussed infra, while all of the other properties were solely
in the name of Rainer Huck, the 224 Iowa Street property was in
the names of both Rainer Huck and Patricia Huck, as tenants in
common.

(Ex.

5).

The final house that was acquired during the marriage was
located at 639 Grand Street and was purchased in December of 1977.
The money for this house was financed entirely by Plaintiff's
father who received a mortgage and a note.

(Tr. 509-510).

Once these houses were obtained they were all self-sustaining
-11-

in that they provided sufficient income to pay any encumbrances
and expenses.

(Tr. 509, 519).

In 1975 Mr. Huck added a garage to the back of the
Street property with money lent to him by his father.

Wi~dsor

(TL 466!

In the summer of 1976 Mr. Huck and his father began building an
addition to the Windsor Street property.

The actual labor for

the addition was performed by Mr. Huck, his father, and a few
contractors.

Approximately $12,000 was spent on the addition

excluding the labor of Mr. Huck and his father.

This money

was with drawn from Mr. Huck's separate account where the majority
was funded by premarital rental properties.
13).

(Tr. 599-601, Ex.

Pat believed that all of the money for this addition came

from Rainer's father.
for the project.

She did not contribute her separate funds

(Tr. 680).

In 1977 Rainer testified that he experienced a frequent
wave of telephone calls in which when he answered the caller
would hang up.

The relationship in 1977 was not good.

The

parties were not getting along very well and were living fairly
separate existences.

(Tr. 480).

In the early part of 1978

because of these persistent telephone calls Mr. Huck fabricated
a machine which would record all incoming and outgoing telephone
calls in the Huck household automatically.

The device was kept

in Mr. Huck's electronic lab on the main floor of the house.
(Tr. 483-485).
During cross-examination of Pat several of these conversations with Stan Secor were read into the record.
660) .

One particular conversation which occurred in April of
-12-

1978 will be discussed infra as to Plaintiff's claim of estoppel.
In July of 1978 Pat took her qualifying Ph.D. exams and
failed them.
program.

She was subsequently terminated from the Ph.D.

(Tr. 490).

In July of 1978 she began working full

time at the University of Utah Blood Bank.

(Tr. 494-495).

Her gross monthly salary at the University of Utah at that time
was $1,080.

(R.

113).

Prior to Pat's failure of the examination and her employment with the University of Utah Hospital she retained attorney
A. Wally Sandack to represent her in a divorce proceeding.

On

April 21, 1978 a letter was sent to Rainer advising him that
his wife was planning on commencing a divorce proceeding and
requesting that he be permitted to discuss financial matters,
disposition of property and other items with Mr. Huck's attorney.
(Plaintiff's Ex. 3).

Rainer and Mr. Cook went to Mr. Sandack's

off ice for the meeting and were informed that he wanted to know
exactly what assets Mr. Huck had including his present income.
(Tr. 489).
Pat Huck testified that the only reason she went to Sandack
in 1978 was to see if he could persuade Rainer to seek counseling.
According to Pat, Sandack's idea was that since it was obvious
her husband was so concerned with financial matters that by
making it appear that the divorce was going to cost him more than
keeping her around that maybe he would reconsider counseling.
(Tr. 686-687).

[Rainer testified that Pat stated to him that

she was going to sue for divorce but that later after the letter
was sent she stated she acted too hastily and wanted to wait for
-13-

the divorce until her exams had been taken.

He aqreed to wait

until the summer of 1978 in order to allow her to study.]
In the summer of 1978 Pat seemed very distraught by the outcome of the exams and therefore Rainer did not wish to add to
her problems by talking about a divorce.

(Tr. 488-490).

In October of 1978 Pat was diagnosed as having cancer
in one breast which required surgery.

Her cancer was found

to be non-evasive and she recovered quite rapidly.

(Tr. 491)

EVENTS OCCURRING AFTER FILING OF DIVORCE
On April 23, 1979 Rainer initiated this divorce action.
(R. 2-4).

At the same time Rainer requested that he be awarded

possession of the house during the pendency of the divorce.
(R.

5-6).

A hearing was held on May 3, 1979 before the Honorable
Homer Wilkinson.

Defendant's attorney requested that Rainer

be ordered to leave the house and allow Pat to remain there.
(Tr. 841).

Judge Homer Wilkinson awarded possession of the

Windsor Street house to Rainer.

He also awarded $250 per month

for the use of the defendant during the pendency of the action.
(Tr. 853-857; R. 27-28).
Subsequently on October 15, 1979, a hearing was held before
the Honorable Christine Durham.

While the hearing centered

around visitation of the minor child, the court also allocated
the $250 which had previously been ordered by Judge \'ilkinson
with $175 as child support and $75 for temporary alimony.

The

court noted that whether this alimony amount would be credited
-14-

to Mr. Huck would depend upon whether the prenuptial agreement
was held valid and binding and whether it would have a retroactive effect to the pending action.

(Tr. 829-830) .

Judge

Durham refused to award attorneys' fees to either party since
both of the parties were employed and earning income.

(Tr.

832; R. 133-134).
Subsequently, a motion was filed by Defendant to disqualify
Plaintiff's attorney Craig S. Cook from representing him in the
lower court.

Depositions of Mr. Cook and Rainer were taken by

Defendant's counsel.
Kenneth Rigtrup.

The question was submitted to the Honorable

Concurrently, Defendant requested that she be

allowed to change her residence to California on the basis that
her family resided there and that she had substantial career
opportunity available in Los Angeles.

(R. 179-180).

On June 24, 1980 Judge Rigtrup granted Defendant's motion
to change residence and denied Defendant's motion to disqualify
counsel.

In addition, he entered an extensive pretrial order

as to the issues remaining to be decided at trial.

(R.

261-265).

The court ordered that all property acquired prior to the marriage
would be awarded to Rainer and would not be subject to division
as a marital asset of the marriage with the exception of the
1195 Windsor Street residence which would be at issue because of
the improvements.

The court ordered that the parties provide

each other with information regarding those properties which
were acquired after the marriage.
Subsequently, on June 24, 1980 Judge Rigtrup awarded
Plaintiff $250 attorneys' fees for his efforts in opposing the
-15-

efforts of Defendant to disqualify his attorney.

ITr.

326).

The trial was commenced on September 5, 1980 before Judge
James S. Sawaya .

A full day of testimony was taken.

The trial

was reconvened on December 19, 1980 before Judge Sawaya.

Dur1n::

the trial Pat submitted an exhibit showing her gross monthly
income from salary and wages to be $1,505.
a thirty hour work week.

This was based upon

(Ex. 16; Tr. 625). In comparison,

Rainer testified that his gross income during this same period
of time was $14, 300.

(Tr. 791; Ex. 30).

Subsequent to the trial memoranda were filed by both
parties in support of their respective positions.
399-409).

(R. 364-396;

On April 22, 1981 the lower court issued a Memorandum

Decision awarding Pat Huck 224 Iowa Street

(the property held

jointly with Rainer Huck); 629 Harmony Court; and 215 Iowa Street.
She was also awarded $3,000 as attorneys'

fees.

(R.

397-398).

On June 17, 1982 the lower court executed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law in accordance with the Memorandum Opinion
but which also contained additional awards.

(R.

While

410-417).

the court denied Defendant's claim for alimony, the court found
"defendant was in need of temporary alimony and support and
continues to need said temporary alimony and support until the
real properties and any incomes derived therefrom have been
delivered and transferred to her as of the date of this Court's
Memorandum Decision in April of 1981."

( R.

413) .

The court further found that Defendant was coerced into
executing the prenuptial agreei,1ent dated April 9, 197')

"1ci

she was already pregnant and had made arrangements for her
-16-

that

marriage prior to being requested to executed said document."
The court noted that Plaintiff had not been prejudiced by the
finding of the court concerning the invalidity of the prenuptial
agreement.
On June 28, 1982 a Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings
was filed by Plaintiff.

(R. 423-425).

A hearing was held on April 7, 1983 at which time the lower
court denied Plaintiff's motion to amend the decree.
This appeal was filed on May 4, 1983.

(R.

4

430).

(R.

) •

ARGUMENT
A review of the file in the district court shows that
many issues were raised by both parties throughout the proceedings.

While plaintiff Rainer Huck does not necessarily

agree with some of the other rulings made by the various district
judges, he believes that these decisions were within the reasonable discretion of the judges and therefore does not contest them.
However, Plaintiff does contest three specific decisions
made by the lower court concerning the following areas:

(1)

the finding that the prenuptial agreement was invalid thereby
allowing the imposition of temporary alimony in favor of Pat;
(2)

the award of attorneys'

fees in favor of Pat in spite of

the failure of Pat to produce any evidence that she was unable
to pay her own fees; and (3) the distribution to Pat of the
houses located at 629 Harmony Street and 215 Iowa Street since
the funds of Plaintiff used to purchase one house were pre-marital
and Pat by her conduct throughout the marriage is equitably
-17-

estopped from now asserting any claim in these houses.
These arguments will now be discussed.
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INVALIDATING
THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT AND IN AWARDING
TEMPORARY ALIMONY TO PAT.
The lower court in its Findings of Fact stated the
following:
9.
The Court finds the defendant was coerced
into executing the prenuptial agreement dated April
9, 1975 in that she was already pregnant and had
made arrangements for her marriage prior to being
requested to execute said document.
The court
further finds that in either case, the plaintiff
has not been prejudiced by a finding of this Court
concerning the invalidity of said prenuptial
agreement and that each and every aspect in the
prenuptial agreement has been met and plaintiff
has received remuneration for property brought
into the marriage and defendant was in need of
alimony and support for the benefit of herself
and her minor child during the course of this
action.
In its Conclusions of Law the court stated:
The court concludes that the prenuptial agreement, dated April 9, 1975 should be void and of no
effect against the defendant.
However, in making
this conclusion, it is recognized by the court that
the plaintiff is not and has not been prejudiced by
such a finding.
(R. 414, 417).
The Findings of the court are in error.

First, there is

no reason that the prenuptial agreement between the parties
should be considered void.

Second, the failure to honor the

prenuptial agreemenl has indeed prejudiced

~r.

Huck.

Even if it is assumed that the testimony of Pat is
correct as to the circumstances surroundino the prenuptial
agreement there is still no basis for voidino it . .'lrs. Huck
-18-

stated that the substance of the premarital agreement was
presented several days before they were married.
at the most.

Four days

She admitted that she sought legal counsel with

respect to the document but that Mr. Sandack said he would not
personally sign the agreement nor would he advise her to marry
Rainer.

Nevertheless, she then took it back to Rainer who had

it modified so that it would not require the attorneys' signatures.

(Tr. 614-615).

At the time the premarital agreement was presented, according
to Pat, arrangements for the wedding had been made.

Her parents

were coming in from California and the printed invitations had
been sent out.

She stated that nobody knew she was pregnant

except her husband and his parents.

(Tr. 615).

She testified

on cross-examination that Rainer would not have married her
had she not signed the agreement.

She stated it almost kept

her from marrying him since she was very disappointed and insulted
that he would require her to sign it.

(Tr. 666).

She admitted

further that the prenuptial agreement specifically waived all
alimony.

(Tr. 685) .

There is no question that Rainer did not want to enter
into this marriage.

He did not believe the prospects of a

successful marriage were good nor did he feel that a child
should be brought into this type of situation.

For many weeks

he told her he did not think it wise to get married.

(Tr. 454)

He also verified that he would not have married her unless she
agreed to sign the prenuptial agreement.

(Tr. 540).

The prenuptial agreement was signed on April 9, 1975, one
-19-

day before the marriage took place.

It was

si~ned

before a

notary public.
The finding that the prenuptial agreement was void because
of coercion by Mr. Huck is both factually and legally in error
While it is certainly true that Pat was pressured into signing
the prenuptial agreement before Rainer would agree to marry her,
it is equally true that Rainer was pressured by Pat to enter
a marriage in the first place.

in~

In other words, there was pres-

sure from both parties against each other and if the prenuptial
agreement is void becuase of coercion then the marriage itself
should also be void.
The finding by the lower court is even contrary to the
statements made by the court during the trial.

The court in

discussing the argument that Pat was coerced into signing the
prenuptial agreement stated:
They are both over 21, I take it when they got
married or at least of legal age and certainly entered
into this agreement or this marriage and agreement
with their eyes open, obviously.
(R. 452).
Even Defendant's counsel did not seriously oppose the
validity of the prenuptial agreement during trial. During
examination of Rainer by his counsel as to the circumstances
surrounding the prenuptial agreement Mr. Sandack objected to
that line of questioning and stated:
Again, the prenuptial agreement is in.
We agree
that it may be valid.
I don't see any necessity of
going on with this any further.
(Tr. 459). See also,
Tr. 450-451.
While there are no Gcah cases directly on point, prenupt1Jor antenuptial agreements entered into by two competent parties
-20-

are valid and enforceable and, in fact, favored by law.
Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, §1.9, p. 27).
The prenuptial agreement entered into in this case (Ex. 1)
is a legally binding contract between the two parties.

At the

time the contract was entered into Pat Huck was 33 years old
and Rainer 28 years old. Both had consulted their attorneys
prior to executing their signature and, in fact, Pat's attorney
advised her against signing it.

The standard for voiding a

prenuptial agreement is no different than any other contract.
In order to show legal coercion, the evidence must be clear,
precise, and indubitable and must be shwon with clear and convincing evidence.

Kelley v. Salt Lake Transportation Co.,

116 P.2d 383 (Utah 1941); In re Swan Estate v. Walker Bank &
Trust Co., 293 P.2d 682

(Utah 1956).

The Colorado Court of Appeals in Matter of Estate of Lewin,
595 P.2d 1055 (Colo. App. 1979) upheld the validity of a prenuptial agreement after one of the parties was deceased and
after it was being attacked by the surviving spouse.

In that

case the surviving wife argued that an antenuptial agreement
was invalid since her husband failed to list all of his assets
in the document and that she was prevented from retaining
outside counsel.

The Colorado Appellate Court held that

neither a listing of assets of the husband nor independent
counsel was necessary to validate a prenuptial agreement.
of course, Rainer both listed his premarital assets in the
agreement itself and Pat was counseled by her own attorney
before electing to sign it.)
-21-

(Here,

The court stated,

"The primary imquiry is •.-Jhether the

parties entered into the agreement with full knowledge of it
consequences."

Id. at 1058.

The lower court's finding that because invitations had
been sent out and because the wedding had been planned is
legally insufficient to amount to "coercion" to invalidate a
written agreement.

The evidence is crystal clear that even

assuming that Pat had only four days to review the documents
(as opposed to Mr. Huck's testimony that she had over thirty
days) that there was ample time for her to knowingly make a
decision whether to sign the document.

The fact that she went

to her attorney who specifically advised her against it but
nonetheless signed it anyway shows that she knowingly and
consciously executed the document on her own free will.
Since the prenuptial agreement in this case was clearly

valid it next remains to determine whether Mr. Huck was prejudic'
by a finding of its invalidity.

Paragraph 6 of the prenuptial

agreement states:
In the event of divorce or separation, Pat
specifically waives any alimony or separate maintenance support provided that she is capable of
self support at such time.
(Ex. 1).
In the May 3, 1979 hearing before the Honorable Homer
Wilkinson the court ordered that Rainer pay to Pat $250 for
the use of her and the child during the pendency of the action.
(Tr. 853-857).
On October 15, 1979 the Honorable Christine Durham allocated this amount with $175 going as child succort and 575
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going for alimony.

Judge Durham noted that whether Rainer

should receive a credit for the temporary alimony paid to Pat
would depend on whether at trial the prenuptial agreement was
found to be valid and binding and whether it would have a
retroactive effect.

(Tr. 830).

Rainer paid Pat $75 from May of 1979 through May of 1981
specifically as temporary alimony.

This amount of $1,800 was

never credited to him in the judgment of the court.

Thus, he

sustained $1,800 of "prejudice" by the finding of the invalidity
of the prenuptial agreement.
Pat argues that in any event she was not capable of self
support at the time and therefore even if the prenuptial
agreement was valid the waiver of alimony did not apply.
argument again flies against the evidence.

This

In the summer of

1979, when Pat separated from Rainer, her total gross income
was $1,140 a month. This did not include the $250 which was
being paid to her by Rainer under the court's order.
her total gross was $1, 390.

(R. 113).

Thus,

In 1980 after moving

to California her gross income including her salary at the
University of California Hospital (32 hours a week) plus her
contract payment, and her child support and temporary alimony
award amounted to $1,795.

(Ex. 16, Tr.

707).

The trial court should have objectively viewed whether
Pat was capable of "self support" and her self serving staternen ts that she could not have provided for herself without the
additional $75 alimony should have been completely discarded.
(Tr. 702, 628).
-2 3-

Certainly, a gross income of $1,700 a month qualifies a
person as self-supporting.

The fact that she chose to only

work 32 hours a week and is living on Balboa Island in a beach
house at $650 a month (Tr. 707) does not detract from this
conclusion.

It is elementary that a person's expenses are

unlimited depending upon the style of living they wish to
invoke.
The lower court specifically awarded no permanent alimony
to Pat finding that she was currently employed and capable of
providing for her own support.

(R. 412).

This conclusion by

itself further supports Mr. Huck's contention that the evidence
is undisputed that during the entire time of the separation
Pat was capable of self support and therefore the provisions
of the prenuptial agreement did not obstruct the waiver to
which she had previously agreed.

A credit for $1,800 should

therefore be awarded to Rainer.
In addition, since the court chose to ignore the prenuptial
agreement it is possible that the court considered Rainer's
Windsor Street residence as an asset of the marriage which was
subject to division.

Since the court did not describe the

division process of property, this case should be remanded (in
the event Point III is rejected by this Court)

to determine if

the division of property was wrongfully decided.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS uISCRETION
IN AWARDING $2,750 TO DEFENDANT AS
ATTORNEYS' FEES.
-24-

In its Findings of Fact the Court stated, "The Court
finds that Defendant was required to retain the services of
an attorney not only to defend the action brought by Plaintiff,
but to prosecute her own counterclaim."

(R. 414, Finding No. 10).

In the Conclusion of Law the Court stated, "That the
plaintiff should be ordered to pay to Defendant for the use
and benefit of her attorneys the net sum of $2,750 plus costs,
all prior awards for temporary attorneys' fees from or to
Defendant being merged herein."

(R. 417, Conclusion No. 9)

The record is barren as to any reason why Plaintiff should
pay attorneys' fees incurred by his former wife.

The only

testimony concerning attorneys' fees was offered by Pat and
by her attorney.

She stated she was forced to obtain the ser-

vices of Mr. Sandack who was charging $50 or $60 an hour which
she believed was fair and reasonable.

She also stated that

he had incurred in excess of 150 hours which she also felt was
reasonable.

(Tr. 637).

Mr. Sandack took the stand and stated that he expended
150 hours in the case and believed that $60 per hour was
reasonable.

Mr. Sandack admitted on cross examination that

approximately 35 hours of this time involved an attempt to
evict Mr. Huck from his house on Windsor Street which was
reJected by the lower court.

(Tr. 736-737).

Except for the above cited evidence, there was no other
testimony or exhibits offered in support of an attorneys'
award.

fee

It was Defendant's burden to prove that she was unable

to pay for her own attorneys' fees and that it was therefore
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necessary to place her obligation upon Painer.

As stated by

the Court of Appeals in Washington:
In determining whether attorneys' fees should
be awarded, the needs of the requesting party should
be balanced against the other party's ability to pay.
In considering the record before us, we find that the
wife has not shown an inability to pay.
In re
Marriage of Young, 569 P.2d 70 (Wash. App~7).
This Court has established a similar standard.

In Adams

v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979) this Court upheld the denial
of attorneys' fees to a wife who was "working and earning money"
and where the record "does not disclose any necessity on the

pa~

of plaintiff for such an award or her inability to pay her own
attorneys' fees."

Id. at 149.

In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980) this Court held
that the award of attorneys' fees must rest on a basis of evidence of need and reasonableness.

7his Court remanded a lower

court's award of attorneys' fees with the following statement:
At no point in the proceedings was any evidence
addressed to whether or not plaintiff would be unable
to cover the costs of litigation; indeed, no suggestion was made by her that she would not be in a better
position than defendant, in light of the substantial
property settlement, to furnish counsel with compensation.
Id. at 1384.
Without burdening this Court with a repetition of the

inco~

of the parties as has been discussed previously, the evidence
shows that Pat in 1979 and 1980 had a higher gross income
than did Rainer.

The figures previouslj listed do not

take into account the additional income which innurs to her
benefit from the income of the three houses awarded to her by
the lower court.
of these houses.

Nor does it take into account the asset value
-26-

If this Court affirms the award of the Harmony Court and
215 Iowa Street to the defendant she will have an increase of
her net income of approximately $400 to $500 a month (resulting
in a net loss of this amount to Rainer) .

In addition, the value

of these houses based upon the 1980 appraisal by Defendant's
own appraiser is in excess of $54,000.
Even if this Court reverses the award of the Harmony Court
and 215 Iowa Streets to Defendant and merely affirms the award
of the 224 Iowa Street property Pat would still be receiving
a net gain of some $250 a month to her income with an asset
valued by her appraiser at $31,400.
The lower court failed to make sufficient findings to justify an award of attorneys' fees.

While it is true that Defendant

was required to retain the services of an attorney to defend
the action brought by Plaintiff and to prosecute her own counterclaim, it is equally true that Plaintiff was required to retain
the services of an attorney for the same reasons.

This finding

hardly satisfies the requirement established by this Court that
she is unable to pay her own attorneys' fees.
District Court Judge Durham in a hearing for visitation,
refused to award attorneys'

fees to the defendant since both

parties were gainfully employed and were earning sufficient
income.

(Tr. 832).

This conclusion is correct based upon the

evidence now before this Court.
In addition, it is impossible to know what basis the lower
court awarded any attorneys' fees since the defendant requested
$9,000 in her testimony.

Again, a quotation from the Kerr case
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is appropriate:
Neither does the evidence reflect any attempt
to characterize the requested award as reasonable.
Testimony regarding the necessi t:,' of the number of
house dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate
charged in light of the difficulty of the case, and
the result accomplished, and the rates commonly
charged for divorce actions in the community is
conspicuously absent.
610 P.2d at 1384-1385.
Plaintiff Rainer Huck contended that much of the attorneys'
fees generated in this case was caused by the actions of defendant
and her attorney.

First, Defendant failed to leave the residence

on Windsor Street at Plaintiff's request even though the house
had belonged to Plaintiff prior to the marriage and even though
she had specifically waived any interest in it in the premarital
agreement.

Three separate hearings were required to finally have

Mrs. Huck vacate the premises.
Second, in the beginning of the litigation Pat made a
claim as to all property which was owned by her husband regardless of when it was acquired and regardless of the prenuptial
agreement.

It was therefore necessary to conduct discovery as

to premarital assets as well as post-marital assets until the
time that Judge Rigtrup in August of 1980 segregated the premarit
properties from disoute.

(R.

261).

Finally, a substantial amount of time occurred because of
the defendant's motion to disqualify Plaintiff's attorney.

Wh1h

Mr. Sandack stated that he did not include this time in his
hours, the fact remains that Plaintiff's attorney was required
to invest substantial time in defense of this motion which was
much greater than the $250 awarded as attorneys'
Rigtrup.
-28-

fees by Judge

In fact, Judge Rigtrup in his Minute Order dated June 24,
1980 correctly characterized this litigation:
The court recognizes that more time and effort
may have been expended in these efforts, but concludes
that based on the circumstances of the respective
parties and considering the antagonism and feelings
generated in this case between the parties over this
issue as well as other issues, that much unnecessary
time has been invested in this case which may not be
fully recognized in the award of fees reckoned on a
purely economic basis.
(R. 326).
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court's award of
$2,750 to Defendant as attorneys' fees should be vacated.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN AWARDING DEFENDANT WIFE THE
PROPERTIES LOCATED AT 629 HARMONY COURT
AND 215 IOWA STREET.
In formulating the distribution of property in a marriage
the court must endeavor to provide a just and equitable adjustment of economic resources so that the parties might reconstruct
their lives on a happy and useful basis.
P.2d 697 (Utah 1974).

Searle v. Searle, 522

The same factors which are examined in

the award of alimony are also examined in the distribution of
property.

MacDonald v. MacDonald, 236 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1951).

This Court has recognized fifteen separate factors to be
utilized in the division of property.

Applying these factors

to the instant case reveals the following:
1. The social Position and standard of living
of each before marriage.
Defendant Pat Huck had been
married, was a widow, a graduate student, and was living
on an income of $300 a month at the time of the marriage.
Plaintiff Rainer Huck had not been married, had acquired
several properties, and was living at the Windsor Street
residence which had been completely paid off.
-29-

2.
The respective ages of the parties.
Mr. Huck
was 28 at the time of the marriage while Mrs. Huck was
33.
3. What each may have given up for the marriage.
Neither party gave up anything for the marriaae since
each pursued their own independent career.
4. What money or property each brought into the
marriage.
Defendant had a $4,500 mortgage credit and
$8,000 cash from the settlement of the estate of her
deceased husband.
Rainer had all or half interest in
nine rental properties plus $15,000 in cash or personal
belongings.
5. The relative ability, training and education
of the parties.
Pat had a master's degree and was a
certified medical technologist with several years work
experience prior to the marriage. She was a Ph.D.
candidate from 1970 through 1978.
Rainer had a B.S.
degree in electrical engineering and obtained a Ph.D.
in electrical engineering.
6. The physical and mental health of the parties.
At the time of the marriage both parties were in good
physical and mental health.
7. The time of duration of the marriage.
The
time of the marriage to the time of the separation was
almost exactly four years.
From the time of the marriage
until Pat's lawyer sent Rainer a letter stating that a
divorce was being litigated was three years.
(Ex. 3P) .
8. The present income of the parties and the oropert
acquired during the marriage and owned either jointly or
by each now.
Pat grossed approximately $17,000 in 1979
excluding child support payments.
Her gross income in
1980 was in excess of $18,000 and involved a 32-hour work
week.
Pat retained all of her personal property includinq
most of the furniture from the house. She has presently
been awarded three additional properties with a rental
income of approximately $500 a month.
Rainer arossed
$14,000 in 1979, had substantially the same income in
1980 and receives all of his income from the rental houses
which he owned prior to the marriage or acquired during
the marriage.
9.
How it was acquired and the efforts of each in
doing so.
It is undisputed that all of the houses, ··1itl1
the exception of 224 Iowa Street, were acquired solely
by Rainer in his own name.
It is also undisputed that
Rainer did all the physical work of restoration ~nd
maintenance in the properties.
Except for the 22~ Iowa
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Street, all of the down payments used to purchase these
properties came from Rainer's premarital funds, from
funds advanced by his partner, or from funds lent to
him by his father.
The only dispute in the record is
whether Pat assisted in the rental of these properties
during the marriage.
10. Children reared, their present ages, and
obligations to them or help which may in some instances
be expected. There is one female child of this marriage
who is now eight years old, in good health with normal
needs.
11. The present mental and physical health of the
parties.
Pat is presently in good health and was in
good health at the time of the hearing.
Rainer is
presently in good health.
12. The present age and life
parties.
Pat is 42 years old with
of approximately 30 years.
Rainer
a life expectancy of approximately

expectancy of the
a life expectancy
is 37 years old with
31 years.

13. The happiness and pleasure, or lack of it,
experienced during marriage.
It is generally conceded
by both parties that the marriage was unhappy from its
inception and the parties agreed that were it not for the
pregnancy of Pat no marriage would have occurred.
14. Any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care
which may have been given to the spouse or others, such
as mother, father, etc. and obligations to other dependents
having a secondary right to support. No such care was
given in this case.
15.
The present standard of living and needs of each
including the cost of living.
At the time of trial the
defendant was living in California on Balboa Island at a
monthly rent of $650.
Plaintiff is not aware of the present
monthly rent she is now paying. A review of the exhibits
offered by Defendant shows that after the marriage her
standard of living is as high if not higher than when she
was living with Plaintiff. Her cost of living is higher
because of the area in which she has herself chosen to
move.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains the same
standard of living he had prior to the marriage and at
the time of the marriage with the exception that he has
incurred loans for payment of real estate taxes which
have depleted his expendible income per month.
This Court in the MacDonald case also stated the standard
for review.

This Court stated:
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It is true, as plaintiff maintains, that this
Court has announced the doctrine that in divorce
cases it will weigh the evidence and may substitute
its judgment for that of the trial court.
Nevertheless, this Court should not do so lightly, nor merely
because its judgment may differ from that of the
trial court. We adhere to the qualifications set
forth in the more recent expressions of this Court:
that the judgment will not be disturbed unless the
evidence clearly perponderates against the findings
of the trial court; or there has been a plain abuse
of discretion; or where a manifest in]ustice or
inequity is wrought.
Id. at 1068.
(Citations in
original opinion omittedf.
Plaintiff contends that applying all of these standards
to the instant case shows that the lower court abused its discretion or comrnitted manifest injustice or inequity by awardina
to Defendant the rental houses located on Harmony Court and
215 Iowa Street.
This contention is based upon two separate arguments.
First, as pertaining specifically to the Harmony Court property
the evidence is undisputed that Mr. Huck purchased this property
with his premarital funds and that the house was thereafter
self-supporting.

Second, as to all properties including Harmony

Court and 215 Iowa Street the conduct of Defendant estops her
from now making any claim to an interest in them.

These argu-

ments will now be discussed.
A.

Because of the Source of Funds Used
to Acquire the Rental Property at
629 Harmony Court was Premarital Funds
the Lower Court Committed Error in
Awarding it to Defendant.

The property at 629 Harmony Court was purchased on June 9,
1975 by Rainer at the purchase price of $11,000.
fore purchased two months after the marriage.
-32-

It was there-

$3,000 was

utilized as the down payment.

This money was withdrawn from

Plaintiff's savings account which contained premarital funds.
(Tr. 507, Ex. 5, Ex. 6).
After the Harmony Court property was acquired it became
self-sustaining in that the rental income paid for any mortgage
payments and other expenses required to maintain the property.
(Tr. 519).
The fact that Fainer utilized his premarital savings to
purchase a house rather than keeping the funds in a bank account
should have had no effect upon the distribution of this asset
to Plaintiff.

In other words, the asset existed through no

effort on Plaintiff's part and she should not now be rewarded
by his prudent investment.
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated the applicable rule of
tracing premarital assets as follows:
Clearly, any property owned by a husband or wife
at the time of marriage will remain the separate property
of such spouse and in the event of divorce will not
qualify as an asset eligible for distribution. We also
hold that if such property, owned at the time of the
marriage, later increases in value, such increment
enjoys a like immunity.
Furthermore, the income or
other usufruct derived from such property, as well as
any asset for which the original property may be
exchanged or into which it, or the proceeds of its
sale, may be traceable, shall similarly be considered
the separate property of the particular spouse.
Painter
v. Painter, 320 A.2d 484 (N.J. 1974) (Emphasis added).
Likewise the Supreme Court of Main in Young v. Young,
A. 2d 386

329

(Me. 1974) held that furniture which was purchased

with premarital money was exempt from marital distribution as
long as the furniture was traceable and c0uld be attributable
to the premarital funds.
-33-

The Supreme Court of Colorado in Gaskie v. Gaskie,

534

P.2d 629 (Colo. 1975) reversed the findings of a lower court
which awarded a portion of a ranch which had previously been
owned by the wife prior to marriage.

The lower court considerec

the increased value of the ranch in distributing various other
marital assets to the husband.

The Supreme Court of Colorado

reversed the lower court's determination and noted that the
evidence showed the following:
(1)
Since reaching the age of majority, she
personally managed the ranch and all dealings have
been done in her name alone.
(2)
Her intent was that the ranch remain her
separate property and its title to her alone.
(3)
The ranch under her management showed a
profit and was never in danger of loss to a mortgage
foreclosure or tax sale and her husband's contributions were never used to prevent the loss of the
property.
(4)
All financing was solely in her name and
with her funds including full payment of the mortgage.
(5)
All proceeds from the condemnation were
kept in a separate ranch account.
(6)
Only she was involved in the complicated
legal affairs of the ranch.
(7)
A quiet title action to the property was
prosecuted in her name alone.
(8)
The husband's pattern of non-involvement in
the ranch was attested to by disinterested third party
witnesses.
The court then made the following statement:
In summary, five volumes of evidence, and even
considering it in the best possible light for John
Gaskie, compels our conclusion that his efforts did
not contribute to enhancing the value of the wife's
property.
He made occasional and minute contribu-34-

tions, which we will not allow to turn into a bonanza.
For any participation in the management of this land,
the husband was adequately compensated by the income
or benefits received therefrom.
Larrabee v. Larrabee,
31 Colo. App.
493, 504 P.2d 358 (1972).
It is manifestly against the weight of the evidence
to conclude that through the parties course of dealings
with the ranch it somehow lost its separate identity
as the wife's sole property and merged into a family
asset.
Nor can we conclude that through the husband's
efforts and earning capacity the wife was able to
retain the ranch, whereas without him she would have
lost it.
Therefore we hold it a matter of law that
the wife's ranch property, its apputenant water rights,
and the condemnation proceeds shall not be included in
the marital estate to be shared by John Gaskie.
Id.
at 632.
(Emphasis added).
Just as in Gaskie, Rainer purchased and maintained the
Harmony Court property with no type of assistance from Pat.
He received no benefit to this property in any way by being
married.
This Court has also recognized that equity will require that
each party to a divorce action recover the separate property he
or she brought into the marriage.

In Preston v. Preston, 646

P.2d 705 (Utah 1982) this Court reversed an order in which the
lower court abused its discretion in failing to credit a husband
for out-of-pocket expenses he utilized in purchasing a recreational cabin when the money came from the sale of assets he had
owned prior to the marriage.
The lower court in awarding Mrs. Huck the Harmony Street
property when no effort on her part contributed to its initial
acquisition or its continued maintenance.
the record,

~his

As is obvious from

marriage occurred only because of the pregnancy

of the plaintiff and was sustained as a matter of convenience
- 35-

to both parties.

From 1975 through 1978 Pat Huck continued

as a full time graduate student pursuing her own independent
career.
It is obvious that had Rainer retained a 9 to 5 Job, Pat
could not now make a claim for the premarital savings account
had he elected to merely keep it in the bank.

The fact that

he chose to use this money to purchase an asset which was also
income producing should not be considered since to do so penalizf
him for the prudent use of his own assets.
As stated by Judge Durham "A trial court considers many
factors in making a property settlement in a divorce action,
but the settlement should not be such ·that one party is damaged
or punished."

Warren v. Warren, 655 P.2d 684, 689

(Utah 1982

(Durham, J. dissenting).
B.

The Evidence Introduced at Trial
Clearly Preponderates in Favor of
Plaintiff's Assertion that Defendant
Should be Estopped from Making Any
Claim as to the Rental Properties
Purchased After Marriage.

The facts in this case are clearly unique.

The parties

uniformly agree that Rainer did not wish to marry Pat and did
so only upon her extreme pressure and upon his desire to
financially assist her while she was attending graduate school
and raising a young child.
The circumstances surrounding the s1qn1n0 of the prenuot1a
agreement from the testimony of defendant herself clearl; illu•
trate che animosity and explosive circumstances surround1nu the
marriage.
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It was the contention of Rainer throughout the trial that
Pat had represented to him prior to marriage and during the
course of the marriage that if he would marry her, help
support her during her education, and help assist in the
raising of the child, that she would make no financial claim
against any assets he acquired during the marriage.

Plaintiff

argued to the lower court that his support of Pat and the child
enabling her to attend graduate school for some three and a half
years together with the award of the jointly owned 224 Iowa
Street property and the requirement of child support was adequate
compensation for a four-year marriage of convenience.
The lower court in awarding the property at 629 Harmony
court and 215 Iowa Street rejected this estoppel argument thereby
giving to Pat, according to her own appraiser, additional property worth over $54,000.
To reject Plaintiff's argwnent of estoppel the lower court
had to disregard the following evidence:
(1)

The testimony of Plaintiff Rainer Huck;

(2)

The testimony of his parents Erna and Herman

(3)

The complete uniqueness which the parties

Huck;

treated the Joint purchase of 224 Iowa Street;
(4)

The tape recorded admissions made by Pat to

Stan Secor as to her statements throughout the marriage
to Rainer.
While it is true that the testimony of Rainer and his
parents can be disregarded as self-serving, this evidence
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together with the undisputed evidence as to the Iowa Street
acquisition and the tape recorded admissions of Pat clearly
show that the elements of estoppel are present and that the
lower court erred in failing to apply this doctrine.
This Court in Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983)
made the following observations concerning doctrine of estopoel
in divorce cases.

This Court stated:

Estoppel is a doctrine which precludes parties
from asserting their rights when their actions or
conduct render it inequitable to allow them to assert
those rights.
The doctrine of estoppel has been set forth
by this Court as follows:
The doctrine of estoppel has application
when one, by his actions, representations, or
conduct, or by his silence when he ought to
speak, induces another to believe certain
facts exist and such other relies thereon to
his detriment.
Leaver v. Grose, Utah, 610
P.2d 1362, 1364 (1980) (Citations omitted).
The common element of the doctrines of waiver
and estoppel is the requirement of action or conduct by the person against whom the doctrines are
asserted.
Id. at 430.
In a case involving a claim of estoppel as to payment of
alimony, this Court stated the requirements which must be shOl"n:
In order to prevail on his theory of estoppel,
plaintiff must prove that defendant, by her representations or actions led plaintiff to believe he
need not pay alimony or child support, and that
plaintiff, in reliance on said representations,
changed his position to his detriment.
In such a
case, enforcement of the decree creates a hardship
and an injustice to plaintiff, and defendant would
be estopped to deny her own misrepresentations,
and estopped from claiming unpaid support.
Ross ·1_:_
Ross, 592 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979).
There is no question but that the doctrine of estonpel is
applicable to this case.

The evidence is 0•1ervhclm1n" that
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Pat repeatedly told the plaintiff that she would make no claim
for any properties he acquired during the marriage.

It should

be borne in mind that the houses which were purchased by Rainer
were all in condition which required substantial renovation.
Rainer, therefore, had to expend a considerable amount of
his labor as well as his money in making these properties

a rent-

able investment.
It would have been foolhardy for Rainer to spend substantial amounts of time, labor, and money on these properties in
a marriage which was admittedly never happy while his wife
attended the University of Utah seeking a professional degree
for her own betterment.

Had not Rainer believed that she

would not be making a claim as to the asset value of these
properties after they were renovated.
The following evidence clearly and decisively shows that
Rainer's claim of Pat's representations are correct and that
the lower court completely ignored the overwhelming evidence
in the record.

The following is a synopsis of this evidence.
1.

(a)
a try.

Testimony of Plaintiff.

Rainer testified that Pat pleaded with him to give her
She told him that she could make a good wife for him

and assist him in his career goals so they could work together
harmoniously.

She told him that if the marriage did not work

out at least the child would have a good start.
the alternative was for her to commit suicide.

She told him
(Tr. 455).

It was agreed prior to the marriage that should the marriage
end in divorce she would make no claims as to the pre-existing
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properties in any way.
(b)

(Tr. 462).

Within the first week or two of the marr1aae Pat

told him that because of the prenuptial agree1'1ent she would
have nothing to do with any of the properties listed there and
wanted nothing to do with any of his rental activities. She
told him she would keep all of her money and her income to
herself and that he should do the same.
(c)

It is undisputed that separate accounts were main-

tained by both parties and that a division of expenses was
maintained by both parties.

Although Pat claimed that Rainer

had written checks on the joint checking account she failed to
produce a single check in which this had occurred.
(d)

All of the properties purchased in 1975, 1976 and 197-

were purchased in Rainer's own name or in conjunction with his
partner Craig Cook.

None of the documents relating to the title.

liens, or encumbrances in any way show the name of Pat Huck.
(Ex.

23).

(e)

In 1976 Pat announced she was very unhapoy in the

marriage and that she intended to get a divorce as soon as ste
completed her education.

(Tr. 468).

She said she wanted to

continue the present arrangement because it would be much
easier for her to continue her education and that she could
perform her research and teach her classes without having to
wor~y

about having her own household.
(f)

(Tr.

469)

In 1977 the state of the marriage was the same.

frequently expressed her intent to

obt~in

a di.orce.

marriage was in a process of moving apart and there
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Pat

The
~ere

proble~'

in many areas that were solved by doing less and less together.
Pat was still engaged in her shoal work at the time and was
working at sporatic hours.
(g)

(Tr. 476).

In 1977 Pat became unhappy because she saw Rainer

doing quite well with the rental properties and wanted to
participate.

This was around June of 1977.

She told him she

would be willing to do the necessary work that was required if
he would buy a property with her. They sutsequently bought the
224 Iowa Street property together which will be discussed
infra.
(h)

(Tr. 477-478).
In April of 1978 Rainer received a letter from Wally

Sandack informing him that his wife was going to obtain a divorce
and seeking Rainer's presence to discuss the division of property.
After confronting Pat about his meeting with Sandack, and informing
her that she was breaking their previous agreement, she denied
this and said she would stand by the previous agreement and would
not attempt to acquire any of his assets.

She asked him to wait

until her examinations were over in July before discussing divorce
further.

(Tr. 490).

Pat specifically and frequently said she

wanted nothing to do with the rental places. When occasionally
a renter would bring his rent over in person she would complain
about the "scuzzy" tenants coming into the house.
complain about the phones ringing during vacancies.
(i)

She would also
(Tr. 580)

On rebuttal, Rainer testified that while his wife

stated on her examination that she always considered half of
the properties to be hers, that this was not what was told to
him during the course of the marriage.
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(Tr. 778).

{j)

As he acquired each property she continued to make

th~

same representations that she was not interested in them and
wanted nothing to do with them.

Rainer stated he relied

uoon

these representations in his continuation of acquiring and
renovating these properties.
{k)

(Tr. 779).

Rainer testified that had she not made these state-

ments he would have done things differently.

He would either

have asked for a new agreement after the marriage or would have
required her to sign a quit claim deed at the time each property was purchased.
2.

(a)

(Tr. 780).

Testimony of Erna and Herman Huck.

Erna Huck, Rainer's mother, stated that about one year

after the marriage Pat said she couldn't get along with Rainer
and it was better that they separate.

She told her that she

wouldn't need anything from Rainer and that she would finish
her school and go her separate way.

(Tr. 766).

Erna Huck

testified that throughout the marriage Pat would periodically
say that she could not stand to be married any longer and
a separation.
(b)

wante~

(Tr. 767).

During the time that she made these statements about

getting out of the marriage Erna Huck was astounded how easily
Pat would make them.

She was not mad or upset during the con-

versations and just said that she had her or0fess1on and didn't
need anything from anybody.
(c)

(Tr. 773).

Herman Huck, Rainer's father,

Rainer were married for about a year she
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stcited that after ?at
suJJenl~

t0lrl h1rn,

to

3:

his astonishment,

that she wanted a divorce.

She told him they

were not getting along very well and that she wanted a divorce.
She said it would be good if the marriage did not last any
longer and that she could find another husband and Rainer
could find another wife.

(Tr. 753).

She told Mr. Huck that

she was going to finish her schooling and that she had a profession of her own and didn't need Rainer to support her.

She

said she could do that herself and that she didn't wany anything
from him.

She said that since she didn't bring anything into

the marriage she wasn't expecting anything out of it.
3.
(a)

The Joint Purchase of the 224 Iowa Street
Property.

In 1977 Pat and Rainer Huck purchased a property

located at 224 Iowa Street.
part of the down payment.
father,
(b)

(Tr. 754).

Pat paid approximately $6,600 as
Rainer received his half from his

a debt for which he is still liable.

(Tr. 478).

The title to this particular house was listed as

"Rainer Huck and Pat Huck,

tenants in common."

(Ex. 5).

Only

on this house of all the houses acquired during the marriage
did Rainer keep a separate ledger as to the expenses incurred
in order that Pat, as an equal partner, would share the expenses
and benefits from the pro=its.

(Ex. 20).

On October 27, 1977

a check was written from Rainer to Pat with the notation "224
to 10/27.177."

This was an amount owing to her as reflected
(Ex. 19, Tr.

(c)

784).

Periodic accounting payments for the property were made

to Pat on October 27,
f'ebtucir'.· ::'8,

1977, December 12, 1977, January 28, 1978,

1978, March 28,

1978, and December 26, 1978.
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(Ex. 25)

(d)

Pat denied that the Iowa Street property was any

different from any of the others.

She could not explain,

howe~

why Iowa Street was the only one held jointly and why she had
specifically paid $7,000 in cash to the seller of that house.
(Tr. 669-673).
(e)

Pat was completely unable to explain why Rainer would

give her money on a regular basis as to the 224 Iowa Street
property and not the others.

She also admitted that the list

of expenses which he kept was showed to her as her share of
the profits from the property.
(f)

(Tr.

715) .

Pat admitted that she did actual physical work at the

224 Iowa Street property but did not perform any other labor at
any of the other rental houses.

(Tr.

674).

She claims she did

this because when they bought it it was in bad shape and needed
to be fixed.

However, she admitted that all the houses that

Rainer bought were also in bad shape but she did not assist in
their repair.

(Tr. 6 74-6 75).
4.

(a)

Tape Recorded Admissions of Pat.

During several telephone conversations which were

recorded by Rainer, Pat told Stan Secor, Rainer's real estate
agent, that she represented to Rainer throughout the marriage
that she was making no claim on his property and
that the Iowa Street property was a

joint partnership.

These

pertinent conversations verbatim are as follows:
Like I alwavs told Rainer before, if this d1dn't
work out, which there was a gooc chance it wouldn't,
that I would just walk with what I had but he oi3ses
me off so bad today you know .
(Tr. 6591
-44-

Yeah, well, I don't know.
I think, you know,
considering that I thought that I would be satisfied
with nothing, you know, anything I get would be something, you know.
Buy my lawyer said he thought Rainer
would be responsible until I finish school and everything that he would have to support me and Sophie.
(Tr. 660).
So anyway I told him I'll pay you.
Don't you
think that's fair?
I mean, I told him what do you
want me to do? What can I do? I asked if there is
something I can do, and he said no, and I said if
you hate me doing it so much, pay a plumber. Well,
you can have all my profits for the rest of the year
and he is just hassling me about it, you know. What
can I do?
(Tr. 675).
(Emphasis added).
Pat did not deny the substance of these conversations
which occurred in April of 1978.

They fully support the testi-

mony of Rainer, his parents, and the documentation as to the
Iowa Street property that Pat repeatedly told him that she was
making no claim on any of his property and that only the 224
Iowa Street property was considered by her as a partnership.
Plaintiff fully agrees with the principle that it is proper
for a wife to receive half of the rewards of the joint marriage
effort.

However, the evidence in this case is patently clear

that there was never any joint effort made by Rainer and
Pat.

Rather, each person pursued their own independent pur-

suits:

he renovating rental properties for the purpose of

supplying an income for his scientific research and she attending
the University to obtain a graduate degree.
The error in the trial court's ruling is even more apparent
if it were assumed that Pat had in fact obtained a Ph.D. in
1978 and was now making a salary of $60,000 a year.

It is doubtful

that any court would award Rainer any property settlerrent on the
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theory that he assisted her in obtainina her e,iuc1tion ar.d
therefore is entitled to some of the proceeds of her labor.
It is equally incredulous that she should expect to share in
his labors in the acquisition of these rental properties.
This marriage is unique.

It did not involve youngsters

who shared their early days together and helped each other in
acquiring assets.

The marriage did not involve parties who

stayed together for 20 or 30 years in building and maintaining
a family and property.

Rather, this was a strained

marriage to

say the least where each party conducted their lives, as much
as possible, on an individual basis. There was no joint effort,
there was no joint sacrifice, and there should,

therefore, be

no joint division.
The lower court clearly abused its discretion and ignored
the clear preponderance of the evidence in awarding Pat the
house located at Harmony Court and 215 Iowa Street.
CONCLUSION
Appellant appreciates the difficulty of any court in
partitioning the assets of a married couple after the failure
of the marriage.

Appellant also acknowledges that the dis-

tribution made by the trial court would be fair and equitable
to another couple with normal circumstances of rnarriaue.
However,

the facts and circumstances of this marriace are

far from normal.

The decision to become married was hard!;

joyous event for either party.
more or less pursued their own lives--he reno\·atiri.; nental
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properties and performing scientific research; she pursuing
her Ph.D. and later working as a lab technician.

The finances

of each party were separately maintained, the expenses divided,
and their activities were individual.
The only joint bond of the parties was their daughter
Sophie.

Both Rainer and Pat helped and contributed to her

early development.

Because of Sophie, Rainer does not bemoan

this marriage in any way.

He only seeks a fair award based on

the facts of the marriage and not based upon a normal, traditional
marriage where both parties were true

partners.

The prenuptial agreement was a binding legal document and
must be enforced.

The evidence shows that, at the time of

separation, Pat was capable of "self support."

The award of

$1,800 temporary alimony should be vacated.
There is likewise no evidence that Pat is unable to pay
her own attorney fees especially if the present profit distribution is upheld.

This award of $2750 should also be vacated.

Finally, the distribution of the Harmony and 215 Iowa
Street property to Pat is improper since Rainer's premarital
funds purchased the one house and Pat should be equitably
estopped from making any claims as to any rental house separately
acquired by Rainer.

The award should be vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
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